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The twin issues of making peace and building it over time, which are very much
at the forefront of social concerns in contemporary India, remain a major source of
worry and require a thoughtful understanding. The lack of effort that has been ded-
icated towards the development of a systematic understanding of the psychological
dynamics underpinning intergroup hostility and violence between Hindus and Mus-
lims in India is disappointing to say the least. While elaborate analyses and accounts
of these intergroup dynamics have emerged from academic disciplines such as soci-
ology, political science, economics and history (e.g. Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar, &
Sen, 1993; Brass, 2003; Engineer, 1995; Lal, 2003b; Ludden, 2005; Pandey, 1991;
Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004), psychological theory and research with some
predictive validity have been slow to emerge (Ghosh & Kumar, 1991; Hutnik, 2004;
Kakar, 1996; Nandy, 1990; Singh, 1989). This brings to the forefront a couple of
basic queries: (a) how can the discipline of psychology contribute towards the cur-
rent understanding of intergroup dynamics in India and (b) can psychological theory
and research translate into knowledge and action to promote peaceful coexistence
in applied contexts?
The objective of this chapter is to address these two questions which comprise
the core of our account. We will begin this endeavour by briefly reviewing theoret-
ical and empirical paradigms that have been explored previously. These will then
be juxtaposed against the historical, social and political contexts of Hindu–Muslim
relations in India to elucidate those issues that have been adequately investigated,
but most importantly, those issues that need further elaboration and inquiry. Before
embarking upon this assessment, we will provide a brief outline of the histori-
cal, political and social contexts of Hindu–Muslim relations in India. We maintain
that for analysing socially meaningful phenomena it is necessary to depart from
the habitually close confines of psychology’s argumentation and to include histori-
cal, cultural, social and political perspectives in analysis and theorising (Valsiner,
2001). Consequently, this chapter aims to gather insights from other disciplines
and integrate them with psychological understanding in order to help augment the
psychology of peace and conflict resolution.
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Hindu–Muslim Relations in Modern India: The Cultural,
Historical, Political and Social Contexts
Islam came into South Asia in the beginning as a religion and then as a political
force. The Arab conquest of Sind (711–715) was followed later by raids into India
by Mahmud of Ghazni (999–1026), rise of the principality of Ghor (1151–1192),
Delhi Sultanate (1211–1504) and the Mughal Empire (1526–1858) at which point
the last Mughal emperor was deposed by the British (Embree, A.T). Islam in India
is the second-most practiced religion after Hinduism. There are approximately 151
million Muslims in India’s population as of 2007 (according to government census
2001), that is 13.4% of the population. Currently, India has the third largest pop-
ulation of Muslims in the world. However, unofficial estimates, coming from both
Hindu and Muslim sources, claim a far higher figure (20–30%) supposedly dis-
counted in censuses. This issue is prominent in political discourse and is amplified
by representatives from both the communities. The pro-Hindutva forces claim that
the high Muslim growth rate is intentional and a threat to the country and its Hindu
character; Muslim spokesmen use it to raise the morale of a minority community
perceived as under threat, economically as well as politically.
In pre-partition India, Mahatma Gandhi described the social tension between
Hindus and Muslims as “the problem of problems” (1930, cited in Singh, 1989).
This saw its manifestation at the time of the partition of the Indian subcontinent.
The partition was witness to the large scale mass migration of 12–14 million peo-
ple; killing of over one million; and sexual abuse of an estimated 100,000 women.
This just constituted the core. All over India, millions were affected by Hindu versus
Muslim riots which were incited by religious hatred and uncontrolled fury. This was
the foundation and the reality of partition.
After partition there was an attempt to forget the painful past and as a corollary, a
collective amnesia shrouded this traumatic period in India’s history (e.g. Lal, 2003b;
Pandey, 1991; Gooptu, 2002). Silence, denial and modification of memory were the
defence mechanisms used to stabilise India and steer it towards a new era. In order
to rectify this collective amnesia, social scientists are now trying to reconstruct the
partition that had virtually become a taboo issue of research and collective thought.
Prior to this, the available literature on partition recounts only its “high politics”:
the constitutional and political negotiations. The trauma and the tandava (dance of
mass destruction) were forgotten. As far as historiography is concerned this fills an
important lacuna. However, at the time of the partition, this imposition of collective
amnesia or, as some would address it, “the tyranny of silence” was probably an
astute political move. Brooding on this event and following the British policy of
divide and rule would have further fragmented India, which it could least afford.
The politics of memory was operationalised.
The nature of conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in India has undoubtedly
changed since the partition. In independent India, all hues of ideological players
have taken part in unleashing retributive violence. For instance, the Indian National
Congress (INC) spearheaded the anti-Sikh violence of 1984, and traditionally the
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state governments led by the INC turned a blind eye to the violence perpetrated by
Hindu communalists. The irony of it all is that Gujarat, the birthplace of Mohandas
Karamchand Gandhi, in 1969, bore witness to a nasty bout of violence against the
Muslims under Hitendra Desai, a “Gandhian”. These were the bloodiest riots after
1947. It is important to bear in mind that the Hindu nationalist movement alone
did not cause the rioting and massacres that occurred during the years of agita-
tion leading up to the demolition of Babri Masjid (Akbar, 2003; Engineer, 1995).
A long history of communalism (i.e. social tensions between ethnic communities) in
which many sides joined over the decades preceded the demolition of the mosque.
It would indeed be simplistic to reduce the history of communalism to the activity
or ideology associated with any one set of sociocultural or political conglomera-
tion because the history of Hindu–Muslim conflict in India is complex. However,
overall, an interdisciplinary agreement exists that the increase of communal riots
over the last three decades corresponds to the Hindu nationalist movement in India
(e.g. Brass, 2003; Engineer, 1995; Jaffrelot, 1996; Ludden, 2003; Varshney, 2002;
Wilkinson, 2006).
The term Hindutva (literally meaning “essence of Hinduism”) was first coined
and popularised by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his 1923 pamphlet entitled
“Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?”. Later it was identified with the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Hindu Mahasabha, which stood for Hinduising
India and militarising Hinduism (Ramakrishnan, 2007). The Muslim League was
organised in 1906 to mobilise Muslim identities for increasing collective Muslim
representation in British India (Hardy, 1972; Jalal, 1985). From the beginning, the
RSS and allied organisations opposed efforts by Gandhi and the INC to unify Indi-
ans of all religions (Basu et al., 1993). All these political outfits had been driven by a
strong religious ideology that had been euphemistically termed cultural nationalism.
However, the most significant facts are as follows: India was born out of “partition”,
and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was shot by a Hindu. Nathuram Godse, incited
by the Hindu lobby, while pretending to touch Gandhi’s feet at a prayer meeting,
fired at him because Godse believed that Gandhi was doing uncontrollable damage
to the Hindu cause because of his “soft line” towards the Muslims. Gandhi paid with
his life for his spirit of secularism and for his efforts at building bridges of peace.
Impelled by the disastrous consequences of ethnic conflict, which engulfed the
subcontinent in 1947, the Indian government took on the role of reforming religion
in the pursuit of social justice and equality. Hence, under the aegis of Jawaharlal
Nehru (the first prime minister of independent India), the concept of secularism
was imported from the West (Chopra, 1994). But its Western interpretation, which
separates state politics from religion, was not followed.
Post-independence, although the constitution was secular, the state apparatus –
bureaucracy, judiciary, army and police – was infiltrated by Hindu communal ele-
ments. This resulted in a social development, which was mixed; on the one hand,
secularism thrived, and on the other, communalism, which was hastily buried, did
not die but remained dormant.
The contemporary Hindu nationalist movement is a network of organisations,
with the core consisting of the RSS, an organisation which was launched in 1925
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on the Vijayadashami Day by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar to champion the cause
of right-wing ideologues; the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Vishwa Hindu
Parishad (VHP). The movement has its roots in the Hindu Mahasabha, and the
emerging new entity is collectively termed the Sangh Parivar – a family of organi-
sations that promotes the ideology of “Hindutva.”
Social changes during the late 1970s and early 1980s gave communalism a strong
boost, bringing the Sangh Parivar into prominence, and this conglomerate started
attacking secularism in a big way. The BJP took on the mantle of “the” communal
party. It quickly mushroomed, introduced communal rhetoric in the social space
and openly declared its agenda of Hindu Rashtra (Jhingran, 1995). It was quick to
capitalise on decades of gradual permeation of Hindutva, and using this as a take-off
point, launched an ideological, social and political onslaught on secular ethos (e.g.
Basu, 1996; Bhargava, 2002; Brass, 1991; Jaffrelot, 1996; Kakar, 1996; Lal, 2003a,
b; McGuire, Reeves, & Brasted, 1996; Nandy, Trivedi, Mayaram, & Yagnik, 1995;
Pandey, 2001; Punyani, 2003; Varshney, 2002; Zakaria, 2002) and syncretic culture
(Sen and Wagner, 2009).
Taking their lessons from this multilayered history, the BJP (1999–2004) made
an attempt to orchestrate a social transition wherein an attempt was made to sys-
tematically crystallise ethnic identities. This trait is perceived in almost all kinds of
nationalisms where, in the bid to create a nationalist identity, the immortality of the
group is emphasised and the arguments in favour of its continuity underlined, so
that people feel impelled to be the torch bearers (Smith, 1998). For instance, during
the BJP regime, the push was that the core identity of a true Hindu be constructed
around ancient Hindu lineage, acceptance of militancy, retributive justification of
violence and perception of secular acts. Reviving Hinduism through the ancient
Indian civilisation theme, the BJP was able to arouse the dormant embers of Hindu
pride and retributive violence. Consequently, when the BJP and its allies sounded
the clarion call for Hindu militancy, many jumped on the wagon. The BJP put into
practice the processes through which traditions and past experiences are used to jus-
tify political agendas (Pennebaker, Paez, & Rime, 1997; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001;
Sen & Wagner, 2005). Events which followed showed that the agenda of balancing
the acts of history was wilfully accepted. Through the agency of Hindu revival-
ism, an attempt was made to harness the Muslim community and thereby rectify
the wrongs suffered by the Hindus when they were under the domination of the
Muslims. The project of Hindutva, which basically focuses on the building up of a
mass mobilisation geared to the task of forging a new “Hindu” nation, began to take
shape, and new symbols were created to operationalise this agenda.
Events which have been witnessed throughout the last decade until the present
establish that Babri Masjid had been the strongest political and social mobilising
force of the Hindutva ideology. The controversial issue of the birthplace of Lord
Rama (Babri Masjid-Ram Janambhoomi) has a long past. It started in 1855. The
Babri Masjid is a mosque in Ayodhya, which is situated in the state of Uttar Pradesh
in northern India. It was built by Mir Baqi, a nobleman in Babur’s court, in memory
of the emperor Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Badshah Ghazi, a minor prince of
Ferghana (in modern-day Afghanistan) who founded the Mughal Empire in India,
Perspective on Hindu–Muslim Relations 47
which ruled until the British Raj finally replaced it after the general mutiny of 1857
failed.
On the night of 22 December 1949, idols of Lord Ram were installed in the
mosque. This started the controversy that came to the fore in 1984 when the first
“religious parliament” (Dharma Sansad) of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, World
Hindu Council) decided to “liberate” the site of Ram’s birth (janam).
Campaigning for the “liberation” of the birthplace and temple of Lord Rama in
the late 1980s, L. K. Advani, the home minister of the BJP, embarked on a char-
iot march (Rath Yatra) that was reminiscent of Hindu epics such as Ramayana and
Mahabharata. He started the journey from the Somnath temple in Gujarat and con-
tinued for weeks before the crusade was stopped in Bihar where L. K. Advani was
arrested (Sen & Wagner, 2005). Although the nature of the campaign was peaceful,
300 communal riots, the largest number since partition, erupted across India in the
same year (Shah, 2004). Markedly, the BJP also gained increased political support.
Following this, a clarion call was made for volunteers (kar sevaks) to assemble at
Ayodhya on 6 December 1992. Millions of volunteers, from all over India, assem-
bled, and in the ensuing fray, the Babri Masjid was demolished in five and half hours
of frenetic activity and its debris thrown in the river Sarayu. Shortly after the demo-
lition, massive riots took place all over India and with a demonic ruthlessness. The
BJP entered the fray and made political capital of the situation.
In 1989, the BJP held only two out of the 544 seats in the Lok Sabha (Lower
House). By 1998, the party had gained 182 seats and ran the government of India
until 2004. Undoubtedly, Babri Masjid, which in reality was a structurally dilapi-
dated monument, was the core image around which the entire edifice of Hindutva
was created. The core image of Babri Masjid – or figurative core (Moscovici,
1976; Abric, 1996) – determined each element of right-wing fundamentalism, its
presence, its value and its function. Connecting an event in political discourse
with Babri Masjid, it seems, was a guarantee to attach symbolic meaning to it,
and vice versa, mentioning the event in turn appeared to objectify the symbol
of Babri Masjid in the national identity. Thus, the trinity of Babri Masjid, Ayo-
dhya and Lord Ram reaped rich dividends for the BJP and brought it to centre
stage.
The power of such events to spark widespread violence and consolidate Hindutva
was demonstrated again a decade later, when a massacre in a train in Godhra (in
the state of Gujarat) left 37 Hindu voluntary workers dead. The workers had been
returning from a ceremony in Ayodhya and were burnt to death. The tragedy was
blamed on Muslim “terrorists” and triggered violent riots of unparalleled brutality.
Hindu mobs targeted Muslim communities throughout the state, and it was reported
that members of the RSS and VHP led the riots. Human rights groups estimated
that the death toll reached between 2,000 and 2,500, with a further 140,000 people
dislocated in the aftermath of the massacres, many of whom still remain homeless
(Brass, 2003; Shah, 2004). In this telling, if not a shocking example of identity
politics, leaders of the BJP and VHP converted the train massacre into a symbolic
representation that mobilised mass support for Hindutva, while the riots became
symbolic of Hindu victory over Muslim oppression.
48 S.S. Khan and R. Sen
Godhra succeeded in keeping the Babri symbol alive and consolidated Hindutva.
These religion-inspired perceptions thus cast their shadows on everyday situations
and were mapped onto the symbol, the masjid, as metaphorical entailment (Lakoff,
1987). Thus, memories related with the event in the past (Babri Masjid, Ayodhya)
became associated with the new representational image (Godhra) and fuelled cog-
nition and affect. This new representation had the power to vitiate institutional pol-
itics. It appears that the evocative strength of these representations, Godhra and
Babri Masjid, when associated with dominance of Hindus, helped to anchor Hin-
dutva, which symbolically represented itself as the supreme saviour of the threat-
ened Hindu dharma (religion).
Trends in Psychological Research
Unfortunately, the complex and multilayered cultural, historical, political and social
contexts of Hindu–Muslim relations in modern India described above have not been
mirrored in the psychological literature. A summary of the existing body of psycho-
logical theory and research addressing Hindu–Muslim relations paints the picture of
a fundamentally fragmented and limited literature. Psychologists across the disci-
plinary spectrum have continuously failed to adequately place mainstream theories
and methodologies within the contextual complexity of Hindu–Muslim relations.
Limited samples, measurements and statistical tests have been ubiquitous. Univer-
sity students, adjective checklists, t-tests and correlations have hardly been com-
pelling in explaining deeply entrenched intergroup dynamics. These points are still
minor compared to the questionability of mainstream intergroup perspectives and
their relevance for assessing and understanding the complex processes within which
Hindu–Muslim relations in India are embedded. Theory building and research sim-
ply cannot attain any predictive validity if the historical, political and social contexts
are ignored. In this part of the chapter, we illustrate the discrepancy between the
psychological literature and the context of Hindu–Muslim relations in India.
As a brief note, we would like to acknowledge that the existing body of psycho-
logical literature investigating Hindu–Muslim relations in India has been reviewed
in different outlets, at different points of time (e.g. Ghosh & Kumar, 1991; Hutnik,
2004; Singh, 1989), and that this chapter does not set out to recreate these accounts.
Although they have been used in outlining this section, we have structured it differ-
ently by presenting and adding research with the intention of assessing the literature
from a peace psychological perspective.
Early Trends and Mainstream Developments
The first, but probably most overlooked, psychological inquiry into Hindu–Muslim
relations in India was conducted by K. M. Panikkar and published in The Contempo-
rary Review in 1927. The paper entitled The Psychology of the Hindu–Muslim Riots
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was written to address a marked increase in hostility and violence between Hindu
and Muslim communities in pre-independent India. Refuting popular hypothe-
ses about essentialist differences, Panikkar proposed that the increase in tensions
between the two religious communities was a direct result of political rivalry and the
distrust of motives in the process of democratisation in India. While the Hindu com-
munity believed that every Muslim worked secretly for the establishment of Muslim
power in India, there was a conviction among the Muslim community that Hindus
wanted to expel them from India. Regardless of the “primitive and barbarous” (p.
235) nature of the Hindu–Muslim riots, Panikkar argued that they were an indica-
tion of Indian dynamism striving to establish a relational definition upon which a
healthy national life could later be structured.
Another landmark study was conducted by S. P. Adinarayan and was part of
his systematic research programme assessing colour prejudice (1941, 1964) and
racial and communal attitudes (1953, 1957). The paper entitled Before and After
Independence: A Study of Racial and Communal Attitudes was published in The
British Journal of Psychology in 1953. The paper reports results from a longitu-
dinal between-subjects study of Hindu versus Muslim students and professionals’
attitudes towards a range of nationalities, such as Americans, Chinese and Turks,
in two samples collected before (1934–1945) and after (1950) the partition. Most
importantly, the study examined Hindu and Muslim participants’ attitudes towards
each other’s religious communities. The results showed that both Hindu and Mus-
lim professionals rated the outgroup more positively than students before the par-
tition. Data was collected only among Hindus after the partition and revealed that
they rated Muslims more negatively compared to what they had done before the
partition.
Panikkar’s (1927) and Adinarayan’s (1953) papers deserve mentioning because
of the pre- and post-independence contexts in which they were published, but
their influence on subsequent Hindu–Muslim relations are not comparable to that
of Gardner Murphy’s (1953) book, In the Minds of Men: The Study of Human
Behaviour and Social Tensions in India. The book summarises three years of
research commissioned to UNESCO by the Indian government in 1949 to exam-
ine the nature of communal tensions in post-independence India, but also to advise
the government on policies for the promotion of social harmony. Multidisciplinary
teams of Indian academics were organised and devoted to examining intergroup
issues of key concern in post-independence India. These issues included the follow-
ing: (a) the hostility between Hindu residents, Hindu refugees and Muslim residents
in Bombay; (b) Hindu–Muslim relations in Bombay, Lucknow and Aligarh; (c) the
adjustment of refugees from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh); (d) the attitudes of
textile mill workers in Ahmedabad and (e) Hindu and Muslim attitudes towards
the tribal population of India. All of the studies were conducted through inter-
views and the administration of attitude questionnaires. The book presents a gen-
eral description and rationalisation of the research, but does not report the research
in full. The reported findings are too dense to review here, but to provide a gist,
excerpts from the first study described how the Hindu refugees reported bitterness
and frustration about their dependence upon the government and their lack of access
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to economic resources and geographic space, whereas the Muslim residents of Bom-
bay reported uncertainty in their request for equal-citizen status. On the other hand,
the Hindu residents of Bombay reported being very much uninformed of the prob-
lems of either the Hindu refugees or the Muslim refugees. Gardner (1953) sourced
social tensions in Bombay to the lack of inter-communication between the two
groups.
Contributions Central to Intergroup Research
While Gardner’s (1953) undertaking was central in stimulating the development
of intergroup research in India, Sinha (1998) and Pandey and Singh (2005) recog-
nised that the fruitful foundation laid by Gardner had been lost over time. Sub-
sequent intergroup research degenerated into causal investigations of the relation-
ships between demographics and personality variables with caste, religious and
other forms of prejudice. This critique still remains relevant and has been supported
in other reviews of the Hindu–Muslim intergroup literature (e.g. Ghosh & Kumar,
1991; Hutnik, 2004; Singh, 1989). An overview of this substantial body of research
is outside the purview of this chapter; hence, we will limit our observations to a few
highly cited and influential papers.
Taylor and Jaggi’s (1974) classic study of stereotypes and intergroup attributions
in South India is by far the most cited publication. Their materials included 16 sce-
narios, involving a Hindu or Muslim actor behaving in either a socially desirable
or undesirable way. Four or five possible explanations reflecting internal and exter-
nal attributions of the behaviours were given per scenario. Two identical adjective
checklists of positive and negative traits pertaining to Hindus and Muslims were also
included in the survey. Without any reference to the history or the state of Hindu–
Muslim relations in India at the time the research was conducted, their results
showed that intergroup attributions and trait ratings were both ingroup favouring and
outgroup derogating. Taylor and Jaggi suggested that their results had confirmed the
link between attitudes, attributions and behaviour by simply having compared inter-
group attributions side by side with corresponding patterns of trait ratings, rather
than having examined their empirical connection. Although conducted in India, this
study has been referenced more widely within mainstream social psychology and
was one of the key pieces of empirical evidence presented in the formulation of
Pettigrew’s (1979) “Ultimate Attribution Error.”
The second most cited and arguably influential paper is Tripathi and Srivastava’s
(1981) study of relative deprivation and intergroup attitudes among Muslim-
university students. Their materials consisted of a scale measuring relative depri-
vation across economic, political and social domains and two identical adjective
checklists of positive and negative traits that assessed perceptions of Muslims and
Hindus in India. Median splits and t-tests of the responses showed that Muslim par-
ticipants with high, compared to low, levels of relative deprivation displayed more
ethnocentric attitudes towards Hindus.
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Finally, the third most cited paper is Hassan and Khalique’s (1981) study of reli-
giosity and its correlates. Muslim participants were found to be more religious than
the Hindu participants, and religiosity was correlated positively with anxiety, author-
itarianism, intolerance for ambiguity and rigidity among both groups. Separate cor-
relations for members of the two religious communities were not presented. Caste,
gender, urban and rural differences were also compared, but showed no differences
in scores between the Hindu and Muslims participants. The higher levels of reli-
giosity found among the Muslim participants attributed the Muslim community’s
minority status and subjective feelings of insecurity and anxiety created by frequent
communal riots.
The three studies outlined above provide a fairly objective representation of the
quality of intergroup research undertaken in India and the areas covered. Unfortu-
nately, recent research trends have generally not been more innovative, nor have they
expanded in scope or enhanced in sophistication (e.g. Bano & Mishra, 2005; Basu,
Hasan, Gangjee, Dasgupta, & Dey, 2005; Basu, Kaur, Ahluwalia, & Gangjee, 2006;
Gaur, 2004; Mishra, 2005). There have been exceptions; however, even these have
failed to contextualise the dynamics between the two religious communities. Theo-
retically and methodologically rigorous studies examining Norm Violation Theory
(Ghosh, Kumar, & Tripathi, 1992), the Ultimate Attribution Error (Khan & Liu,
2008) and Integrated Threat Theory (Tausch, Hewstone, & Roy, in press) among
Hindus and Muslims in India have all involved the blind implementation of main-
stream theories of intergroup relations. The only contextual factor that has really
been taken into account is the relative demographic size and status of the two reli-
gious communities in India, that is the Hindu community’s majority status and the
Muslim community’s minority status. Community-level differences and unantici-
pated results have been attributed to a wider range of historical and sociopolitical
factors by default, but these have never been operationalised, empirically tested or
explained.
A Peace Psychological Perspective of Hindu–Muslim Research
Peace psychologists (e.g. Christie, 2006; Leong, 2003; Montiel, 2003; Vollhardt &
Bilali, 2008) and Indian social psychologists (e.g. Ghosh & Kumar, 1991; Hut-
nik, 2004; Pandey & Singh, 2005; Sinha, 1998) agree that research and theo-
ries emanating from their respective, yet overlapping, disciplinary domains of
inquiry cannot ignore the wider contexts of the people and processes that they
set out to understand. Sinha (1998) and Pandey and Singh (2005) have taken this
standpoint towards the Indian literature in general and propagated for increased
cultural relevance through the indigenisation of theory and methodology. Ghosh
and Kumar (1991) and Hutnik (2004) addressed the Indian Hindu–Muslim liter-
ature specifically and were in general agreement with peace psychologists (e.g.
Christie, 2006; Leung, 2003; Montiel, 2003; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2008) regard-
ing the importance of contextualisation in studying the antecedents of intergroup
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violence and harmony. There is no doubt that these calls for contextualisation are
important, but they run the risk of lingering in the same vacuum as the exist-
ing body of Hindu–Muslim literature, without complementary suggestions for
improvement.
Even if miniscule, there has been an alternative line of Hindu–Muslim research
surfacing in the peripheries of mainstream social psychology. Moving beyond the
study of mental processes, the primary focus of this trend has been the study of
historical, cultural, social and political contexts within which the Hindu and Muslim
communities of India are embedded.
At this point it is appropriate to dip into history. As described at the out-
set of this chapter, the most significant change in Indian society in the last two
decades has been the switch in the political hegemony of the INC and their secular
democratic politics to the establishment and legitimisation of chauvinistic and
exclusionary Hindu nationalist ideologies across the spheres of Indian society.
Social psychological literature in this field has dealt with these issues in greater
depth than was usually seen in earlier studies which, having been tied by the con-
straints of psychology per se, remained microscopic in their approach. The follow-
ing research studies have perhaps transcended this limitation, and we will briefly
describe them since they may help create a trend towards a more robust understand-
ing of psychological issues related to conflict, violence and, by default, peace and
conflict resolution.
Tripathi (2005), in his paper on Hindu Social Identities and Imagined Past: The
Face-off Between Ram Temple and Martyred Mosque at Ayodhya, succinctly argues
that social identities emerge and fade on the basis of a social context, and most
often situations are attributed meanings which are based on one’s lived experiences.
In the course of the paper, Tripathi assimilates the discourse on communalism and
its various hues to help understand the dynamics of the Ram Janambhoomi issue at
Ayodhya. The historical context of the conflict is presented and an attempt is made
to demonstrate how past memories are selectively employed for the dual purpose
of constructing as well as maintaining social identities. This thesis has been sup-
ported by interview data obtained from both Ram Bhakts (devotees of Ram) and
students. It is illustrated that the formation of social identities is a complex and
continuous process in which groups use different pasts. The final argument is that
in contemporary India, there is a need to create a space for positive recollection
of the past and to integrate it with the present in order to help create a syncretic
culture.
Similarly, making use of interview data, Sen and Wagner (2005; 2009; Sen,
2005), with the belief that Hindu–Muslim conflict in India poses a permanent
threat to the country’s peace and civil relations, conducted a field study in Dhar-
avi, allegedly Asia’s largest slum and high on the scale of a riot-prone area. The
respondents belonging to both Hindu and Muslim communities were personally
familiar with violence since they resided in Dharavi, where the demolition of the
mosque at Ayodhya had been the site of one of the bloodiest riots. Given the com-
munal surcharge and politically sensitive nature of the research, they made use
of visual stimuli. In order to illuminate the symbolic representational value and
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affective power of pictorial propaganda, images depicting historical events (such
as those from the 1992 and 2002 events, as well as from earlier events) and politi-
cal symbols were presented to Muslim and Hindu respondents in an interview. The
respondents were shown the visuals and then their reactions, which became akin
to storytelling, were probed. Reference can be made to Mamali (2006), regarding
the usefulness of this methodology and its implications. Setting aside interview-
related logistics, visual stimuli were also used by Sen and Wagner because they
believed that historical symbols are part of a cultural narrative which can be used to
mobilise public opinion, since it is assumed that there is a feedback loop between
representations of the past and the social identities of the here and now.
In their first paper, Sen and Wagner (2005) show how symbols used in daily
political life are powerful in evoking representations from past events, for exam-
ple relating to the division of India more than half a century ago. They argue that
these representations are still strongly affectively charged and lend their mobilis-
ing force to promote interethnic hatred and violence even today, and accordingly
are exploited by fundamentalist politicians. Hindu and Muslim representations are
similar in their cognitive content, but opposed in their affective and motivational
charge.
Based on the same field study, Sen (2005) in Us vs. Them and Gandhi: The
Case of Hindu–Muslim Conflict in India argues that symbols, myths and metaphors
(social representations) can modify the existing knowledge base. Their results
showed that by changing the definition of words and by the introduction of a new
representation, Hindu nationalist ideologues made an attempt to change collective
thought and thereby increase their hold on the Indian mindset, and Militant Hin-
duism, a new reincarnation of Hinduism, had slowly become a shared representa-
tion. Members of both Muslim and Hindu communities had begun to feel that their
religious identity had been diluted and that this should be rectified. Thus, social
positions and newly emerging social identities had begun to anchor and force them-
selves upon the cognitive system.
Adding yet another dimension to the research on Hindu–Muslim relations, Sen
and Wagner (2009), in Cultural Mechanics of Fundamentalism: Religion as Ideol-
ogy, Divided Identities and Violence in Post-Gandhi India, analyse the history and
present of Hindu fundamentalism as it developed since India’s independence. It is
shown that in the course of its rise, Hindutva deconstructed Gandhian symbolism
of non-violence, re-interpreted cultural symbols to become political signs and pre-
pared the ground for communal violence. Secularists and the religious outgroup –
Muslims – became targeted as enemies. In the resulting Hindu ethnic dominance,
religion was changed from being a faith and turned into an ideology. It is shown that
such an ideologically charged mindset draws on a distinct religious and ethnic iden-
tity, erects strict borders towards other groups and justifies violence against them by
their mere otherness.
A different methodological approach to the same phenomena has been taken by
Khan, Liu and Fischer (2007, 2008) in their ongoing research programme, which
investigates the structure and content of the Hindutva ideology and its workings
within India’s social and political processes. Elaborate thematic analyses (Braun &
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Clarke, 2006) of foundational and official Sangh Parivar publications, such as
Savarkar’s (1923) pamphlet Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? and Madhav Sadashiv
Golwalkar (1939) book We or Our Nationhood Defined, yielded 10 recurring histori-
cal narrative templates (Wertsch, 2002) not only on the subjects of the heritage of the
Hindu faith, people and nation, but also on the historical influences of Christianity
and Islam in the Indian subcontinent. For example, one of the themes involves the
idea that “true” Indians share a bond of common Hindu blood inherited from the
ancient Indus civilisation. “Outsiders,” such as Arabs, Turks and British, who can-
not trace their heritage back to the Indus civilisation can therefore never consider
themselves to be true Indians. A second theme involves the notion that India and
Hinduism are indistinguishable. This ideological proposition actively rejects secular
democratic governance of India and justifies the subordination of minority groups
that are not indigenous to the Indian subcontinent, such as Muslims and Christians.
Scale items were extracted on the basis of the thematic analyses in the second
phase of the project and piloted together with a range of generalised psychological
variables of prejudice. The quantitative analyses culminated in a 12-item scale of
Hindutva ideology that predicted variance in socio-politically relevant dependent
variables, such as support and justification for the demolition of the Babri Masjid
and the banning of religious conversion of Hindus, above and beyond variables, such
as Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996) and Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). The project is cur-
rently in its third phase, investigating how the relationship between Hindutva and
prejudice towards Muslims is aggravated and mitigated by social processes, such
as collective remembering (e.g. Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Pandey, 2001), eco-
nomic competition (e.g. Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998) and intergroup contact
(e.g. Allport, 1954; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Pettigrew, 1986).
The studies outlined above provide a convincing account of how a social phe-
nomenon, comprehensively researched within the disciplines of history, political
science and sociology (e.g. Brass, 2005; Engineer, 1995; Jaffrelot, 1996; Ludden,
2003; Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2006), can and has been integrated into the
domain of psychology. The research has described the sociopolitical context within
which the indigenous Hindutva ideology emerged, qualitatively and quantitatively
operationalised the ideology and examined the social and political processes within
which the ideology is embedded. The research may be classified under indigenous
and peace psychology. It contributes to both, but most importantly, it has con-
tributed to an increased psychological understanding of one of the most pertinent
sociopolitical dimensions within which the Hindu–Muslim relation in modern India
is located.
Further, the cultural dynamics analysed in the above-mentioned studies cast some
doubt on the view that religious fundamentalism is first and foremost a psycholog-
ical phenomenon (Ellens, 2006; Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005). We do not wish
to minimise the role of psychological factors in general, but movements such as
Hindutva as well as others around the world embrace too many different people to
be accounted for solely by shared psychological traits; instead, the actors share a
similar background of culture, social class and caste. Perhaps we may suggest that
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fundamentalist movements that blossom hand in hand with nationalist politics are
at their core, collective events that irresistibly engulf the individual actors and bring
them to commit acts that only become possible with the background of mass action.
The underlying psychology is a societal psychology of collective representing and
acting rather than a psychology of personality. We are talking here of collective
states and not of individual traits.
An integration of indigenous and peace psychological perspectives will be fruit-
ful not only in the development of a multidisciplinary study of Hindu–Muslim rela-
tions in India, but also in understanding intergroup relations in other parts of the
world. Peace psychology explicitly recommends theoreticians and researchers to
take into account the geo-historical context (Christie, 2006) in the study of inter-
group violence and peace. Hence, it is directly aimed at building an understanding
of the factors and processes that bring upon and reduce intergroup violence. Like
indigenous psychology (e.g. Enriquez, 1994; Hwang, 2005; Sinha, 1998), peace
psychology can be understood as the study of people for the people, with a focus
on intergroup relations. The theoretical foundations of indigenous and peace psy-
chology have already been paved, but the combination and application of these
perspectives to the study of Hindu–Muslim relations in particular, and intergroup
relations in general, remain unexplored. An indigenous approach to theory build-
ing and research would limit itself to the study of indigenous Indian constructs and
processes, but combined with a contextualised peace psychological analysis of inter-
group violence and peace, the scope can be extended to include complex multidis-
ciplinary descriptions.
Suggestions for Future Research
No specific research programme can explain the complete spectrum of variables and
processes underpinning any given intergroup context. A comparison of the literature
that has emerged from psychology with the disciplines of history, political science
and sociology suggest that multiple avenues can and should be further explored
for the development of a peace psychology of Hindu–Muslim relations in India.
Some frameworks that have emerged from other social sciences, which we believe
warrant further psychological inquiry, will be proposed and outlined in this part of
the chapter. Our suggestions are by no means complete, but provide some insights
and examples of how interdisciplinary bridges can be built between psychology and
other social sciences.
Interethnic Engagement
Varshney (2002), Brass (2003) and Wilkinson (2004) have proposed that Hindu–
Muslim violence is likely to be instrumentally incited for electoral advantages, par-
ticularly in times of upcoming elections. For example, Hindu nationalist parties tend
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to represent primarily the upper castes and fail to attract lower-caste Hindus with
promises of redistribution for two reasons. First, the promise would not be credible.
Second, it may alienate upper-caste supporters. When electoral forecasts predict a
loss or close race, Hindu–Muslim riots are incited to pull more support and votes
from lower-caste Hindus for Hindu nationalist parties. Brass (2005) has referred to
this as institutionalised riot systems.
But not all Indian cities experience outbreaks of violence in these times.
Varshney (2002) has proposed that the main differences between Indian cities
that experience Hindu–Muslim violence compared to peaceful coexistence are
the levels of interethnic engagement experienced between the two religious com-
munities. Interethnic networks build bridges, manage tensions and are agents
of peace, but if the communities are organised along interethnic lines and the
interconnections with the other community are weak, or even nonexistent, then
eruptions of violence are likely. Varshney supported his thesis by classifying
Indian cities into riot-prone versus peaceful cities on the basis of Hindu–Muslim
riot statistics ranging from 1950 to 1995. Case studies of selected cities cho-
sen on the basis of similarities in demographic proportions provided descrip-
tions of how interethnic networks had failed to develop in riot-prone cities (e.g.
Ahmadabad, Aligarh and Calcutta) and prospered in peaceful cities (e.g. Luc-
know, Hyderabad and Surat). Everyday and associational engagement between
members of the Hindu and Muslim communities in the form of routine every-
day interactions, peace committees and business associations flourished in peaceful
cities, whereas interethnic networks were weak and even nonexistent in riot-prone
cities.
The role of interethnic engagement in the promotion of peace has arguably
already been explored in studies of the contact hypothesis, but existing research has
not told the complete story. Tausch et al.’s (2009) research examined intergroup
contact without classifying the contexts within which the interactions were taking
place. Furthermore, the research did not compare riot-prone versus peaceful cities.
It is undoubtedly important to understand that intergroup contact affects intergroup
attitudes, but to be able to translate research findings into preventions and interven-
tions, it is even more important to understand the contexts within which intergroup
contact promotes peaceful coexistence. How then do the contexts of Hindu–Muslim
contact differ in riot-prone versus peaceful cities? What contexts of intergroup
contact make the Hindu and Muslim communities more resistant to the pressures
of polarising political discourses? Arguably, these two questions can be answered
by examining intergroup contact in multiple contexts to explore the circumstances
and conditions that most effectively buffer communal tension, prejudice and
hostility. Adequate sampling from riot-prone and peaceful cities would allow for a
comparison of differences in the nature of Hindu–Muslim contact in the two types
of cities. The outcomes from such a research programme would systematically
elucidate the psychological and structural variables that differ between the two
types of cities. The research findings could then be used as an empirical foun-
dation for lobbying social and political policies that promote peace in riot-prone
cities.
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Urban Versus Rural India
Hindu–Muslim violence is primarily an urban phenomenon, and intergroup relations
in rural India, where a majority of Indians still live, have largely been unaffected by
outbreaks in the urban centres. Between 1950 and 1995, rural India accounted for
just 3.6% of the deaths in Hindu–Muslim violence (Varshney, 2002). Thus, there is
a call for research to expand sample coverage into the rural areas of India, particu-
larly in states fraught with communal tension and violence. Shankar and Gerstein’s
(2007) qualitative research provides one example of how the foundation of such
research could be structured. Following the 2002 Gujarat riots, they interviewed a
small sample of Hindu and Muslim residents living in the city of Vadodara and tried
to describe the rationale for their perception of violence and their beliefs about solu-
tions between the two religious communities. The interviews revealed that the resi-
dents had not experienced any particular change in the relationship between the two
groups before and after the riots. There was always a sense of uncertainty and fear
of another eruption, but generally the residents expressed hope for the future and
for the younger generations to learn how to live in peaceful coexistence. The perpe-
trators were unanimously believed to be outsiders, and the responsibility for bring-
ing peace and harmony was mainly perceived to be with the community itself, but
also with the government. By asking larger samples of urban and rural populations
similar questions, systematic comparisons of responses could unearth important dif-
ferences in cognitions and processes underpinning communal tensions and peaceful
coexistence between these two populations. Specifically, comparisons could clarify
how intergroup perceptions and communications between the two populations dif-
fer in everyday interactions and during episodes of communal tension and violence.
Elaborated insight into the difference between the two populations and how they
cope with inflammatory political discourses would be particularly important and
relevant. The findings could be used as an empirical foundation for future research
addressing whether and how dynamics in rural communities can be implemented in
urban populations to promote peaceful coexistence. Once a range of central factors
and processes have been identified and narrowed down, research in this area would
not have to be restricted to exploratory qualitative methods, but could also include
quantitative methods and action research projects.
Development and Operationalisation of Context-Sensitive
Measures
More importance has to be placed upon the development and operationalisation
of context-sensitive measures in the future. For example, even though resistance
against polarising political discourses could easily be assessed with scales of sym-
bolic and realistic threats (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), or with the Hindutva scale
developed by Khan et al. (2007, 2008), existing scales of realistic and symbolic
threats have not been developed, or even modified, for the Hindu–Muslim context.
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This is likely to explain why Tausch et al. (2009) did not find symbolic or realistic
threats to mediate between intergroup contact and attitudes among either Hindus
or Muslims. A more context- and conflict-specific modification of the scale items
would very likely have yielded different results. For example, realistic threats com-
monly evoked by Hindu nationalist parties and politicians against Muslims include
government funding for the maintenance of medieval mosques, the construction of
new mosques, hajj subsidies and the inclusion of Muslims in the reservation quota
for central government jobs and university admissions. Symbolic threats include
conflicting loyalties and interests towards India and Pakistan among Indian Mus-
lims and the fertility rate of the Muslim population, which is often argued to be
proportionately higher than that of the Hindu population (see Jefferey & Jefferey,
2002). These are just some examples of political content that could be integrated
into the items of the existing scales of realistic and symbolic threats. The medi-
ating effects of polarising political discourses could alternatively be manipulated
in experimental settings by presenting Hindu and Muslim subjects with literary
or audiovisual materials from actual political campaigns. Studies of this nature do
not necessarily have to be limited to examining intergroup contact, attitudes and
their mediators, but can also include a range of other relevant structural, social
and personality variables. What is most important is that theories and methodolo-
gies that are implemented are grounded in the geo-historical context of Hindu–
Muslim relations in India. This does not necessarily imply that frameworks derived
from Western or other non-Indian contexts should be completely discarded; they
just have to be adequately assessed and modified before implementation. Selected
mainstream intergroup frameworks currently exist, for example intergroup emotions
(e.g. Mackie & Smith, 2002) and intergroup forgiveness (Moeschberger, Dixon,
Niens, & Cairns, 2005; Tam, et al., 2008, 2007; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008), that
certainly could prove to be relevant for the promotion of peaceful coexistence.
Future studies could unveil not only how narrative templates of historical intergroup
transgressions within the Hindutva ideology implicate adverse intergroup emotions,
but also if and how these could be reduced by intergroup forgiveness. If the null
hypothesis is rejected, the concept of intergroup forgiveness would warrant seri-
ous consideration in future research and roundtable discussions on policies for the
promotion of peaceful coexistence between the Hindu and Muslim communities of
India.
Towards Syncretic Cultures
In the aftermath of the Cold War, it is increasingly evident that violence is not pri-
marily between nation states engaged in power plays; it is increasingly between
ethnic or religious groups, often within nation states. The case of Hindu–Muslim
conflict with which we have dealt is a pointer in that direction.
The communal environment that consequently loomed after the partition led Hin-
dus and Muslims to anchor their sense of identity and self-esteem within their own
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cultural group. This enhanced a sense of security, but also pride that was stoked
by demagoguery to help sustain their political agendas. This in turn strengthened
each group’s sense of identity, and not only promoted a negative perception of the
other group but also led to a hetero-referential perception of experiences (Shankar &
Gerstein, 2007; Sen & Wagner, 2005, 2009; Sen, 2005; Kakar, 1996, 2000). Ethnic
identities became focussed, stereotypes heightened and a perception of each other
in terms of shared category characteristics was formed. Consequently, an inevitable
homogenisation and depersonalisation followed.
The cultural dynamics analysed in the context of Hindu–Muslim conflict in con-
temporary India shows that increasing numbers have begun to allude to religion as
becoming their all-encompassing and exclusive identity that sets them apart from
their neighbours who do not share in the same creed, hence creating sharp divi-
sions between proximal ethnic groups. Driven by factors more akin to an ideological
mindset, people have begun to mould their behaviour within the straitjacket of pre-
specified terms of reference, which are circulated at the collective level. Such over-
arching systems of partitioning have led to the creation of different ethnic identities
where a singular trait, based on religion, foments the entire structure of the iden-
tity and hastily reduces the complexity of identity to a unidimensional phenomenon
(Sen, A. 2006).
A new frame of reference grounded in an interactive historical past has to be cre-
ated in order to resolve this complex issue. Academic discourse needs to accept that
peacemaking in situations of interethnic conflict is highly dependent on social rep-
resentations of historical conflict (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu &
Atsumi, 2008). In the Indian context, the right-wing ideologues have subverted his-
tory and created their own charter which led to clear divisions in the polity. How-
ever, the same processes can be turned on their head. Referential points of anchoring
derived from syncretic cultures and the use of collective symbolic coping (Wagner,
Kronberger, & Seifert, 2002) can help to overcome interethnic divide. Once iden-
tified, these referential points may help in promoting an integrative process that
may lead to the formation of a syncretic plural society which is based on the strong
foundation of a multilayered identity, where religion is considered a factor, amongst
many others, on which identity pivots itself (Tripathi, 2005).
As our analysis shows, both Hindus and Muslims had gradually set aside the rich
cultural heritage of syncretic religion and rode rough shod on little traditions during
the BJP regime. Rustic homilies, exotic and integrated remixes, which served as a
spiritual balm, were replaced by didactic religious tenets. Consequently, the lines of
ethnic identity had become clearly demarcated, and syncretic culture did not seem
to be attractive. It appeared to have lost its pull.
Sen and Wagner (2009) argue that this trend was in sharp contrast to earlier
Indian culture, where often enough, the religious space of common people remained
fluid and incorporated elements from the great traditions, whatever be their origin:
Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist or tribal. This eclectic assimilation, which was free from
the boundaries of religion, had helped people to come to terms with an often hos-
tile environment within which they existed. The most outstanding example of such
cultural intermingling was that which took place between Hindus and Muslims over
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an extended period and gave rise to syncretic popular cultures, which are not cen-
trally organised and lack a formal canon. Both religions had integrated some aspects
of the other within their own mainstream religiocultural matrices. As a result, syn-
cretic cultures grew. Consequently, unusual gurus, “the dramatist of popular angst”
(Banerjee, 2002), struck a chord in people’s imagination. Banerjee’s account of saint
Satyapir or Satyanarayan who claimed that “I am Rahim in Mecca, in Ayodhya
Ram ” lucidly illustrates this dual religious identity. Two distinct religious identi-
ties (Hindu and Muslim) were merged and used interchangeably. Yet another testi-
mony of this cultural intermingling was that all over India, posters were sold which
together with the icons of Mecca and Medina depicted the portraits of saints and a
pictorial version of the legends and miracles associated with them. Such syncretic
cultures, we believe, will help strengthen the roots of a multicultural society by
being effective in overcoming the power of institutionalised riot systems, blurring
interethnic lines and increasing interconnections/contact. These may together help
in evolving a reconciliation perspective which is a step towards resolving emotional
issues that may have previously left ethnic groups estranged (Nadler & Liviatan,
2004).
In the creation and maintaining of such syncretic cultures, it is the richness of
multidimensional identity and the use of symbolic coping mechanisms which per-
haps need to be focussed on and their importance cognised. A lesson for this can be
learnt from Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who, in pre-independent India, through
the use of symbols helped to bridge the schism between the Hindus and Muslims
and managed to overcome the British policy of divide and rule (Sen & Wagner,
2009). This approach if adopted may help replace the cacophony of discord with
harmonious coexistence and be an important step towards the creation of peace in
Asia.
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